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INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND PUBLIC
HEALTH RESEARCH: AN ANALYSIS
L. Lynn Hogue*
A flexible policy is essential. Research, development, and the re-
duction to practice of new ideas are not carried out in a practical,
ethical, or legal vacuum. The public interest obviously would not
be served by an inflexible approach to what can or should be done.
Ultimately, the decisions required . . .must depend upon the
common sense and sound professional judgment of reasonable
men.'
D. T. Chalkley, Ph.D.
Introduction
Experimental medical procedures have been subjected to litiga-
tion,' numerous studies,3 and congressional hearings investigating
abuses,4 as has human experimentation in educational' and psy-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; A.B., William Jewell
College, 1966; M.A., University of Tennessee, 1968; Ph.D., University of Tennessee, 1972;
J.D., Duke University, 1974; Member, North Carolina Bar.
The author would like to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Professor Robert H.
Marquis of the UALR School of Law, who read an early draft of this article.
At this writing the National Commission was in the process of debating successive drafts
of IRB Recommendations. To the extent possible under publishing deadlines, this article will
consider the latest position taken by the Commission with respect to the implementation of
DHEW regulations on the protection of human subjects.
1. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., and Welfare, The Institutional Guide to DHEW Policy
on Protection of Human Subjects, iii (1971) [hereinafter cited as Institutional Guide].
2. E.g., Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d
818 (1964), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965) (hypodermic
injection of cancer cells into 22 human patients).
3. E.g., H. Beecher, Research and the Individual (1970); Biomedical Ethics and the
Law (J. Huber & R. Almeder eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Biomedical Ethics]; Experi-
mentation with Human Subjects (P. Freund ed. 1970); C. Fred, Medical Experimentation:
Personal Integrity and Social Policy (1974); N. Hershey & R. Miller, Human Experimentation
and the Law (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hershey & Miller]; J. Katz, Experimentation with
Human Beings (1972); Houlgate, Rights, Health, and Mental Disease, 22 Wayne L. Rev. 87
(1975); Ladimer, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Medical Research on Human Beings, 3 J. Pub.
L. 467 (1954); Mullen, Human Experimentation Regulations of HEW Bar Georgia Medicaid
Cutbacks, 10 Clearinghouse Rev. 259 (1976); Viewpoints on Behavioral Issues in Closed
Institutions, 17 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1975); Note, Medical Experiment Insurance, 70 Colum. L.
Rev. 965 (1970); Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 99 (1967);
Comment, Non-therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 24 Syracuse L.
Rev. 1067 (1973).
4. E.g., Hearings on Quality of Health Care-Human Experimentation before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, S. Rep. No. 381, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3634, 3638 [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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chologicall research. This article explores another area of nonmedi-
cal, experimental research on human subjects-public health re-
search'-and suggests a proper analytic framework for those con-
cerned with the protection of human subjects of such research. It is
assumed that institutional review by boards designed to prevent
abuses in experimental, therapeutic' medical research can and does
5. E.g., DuVal, Educational Research and the Protection of Human Subjects, 1977 Am.
B. Foundation Research J. 477, 519:
Historically the emphasis in the regulation of research for the protection of subjects
has been in the biomedical context. The nature of harm that students and teachers
may sustain as a consequence of their participation in educational research differs
markedly from, and on the whole is less dramatic than, that which may arise from
biomedical research. Educational research does not present the risk of physical
injury that is often inherent in biomedical research. Educational research may
result in psychological stress and may invade the privacy interests of teachers and
students. But while both the intentional infliction of psychological harm and the
invasion of privacy are actionable, the likelihood that substantial damages will be
imposed is less than in biomedical research.
6. Ad Hoc Comm. on Ethical Standards in Psychological Research, Ethical Principles
in the Conduct of Research with Human Participants (1973); London, Experiments on Hu-
mans: Where To Draw the Line, Psychology Today, Nov. 1977, at 20. E.g., Ethical and Legal
Issues of Social Experimentation (A. Rivlin & P. Timpane eds. 1975); Social Research in
Conflict with Law and Ethics (P. Negelski ed. 1976).
7. A fundamental characteristic differentiating "public health" from other health and
medical disciplines is its corporate focus or emphasis on more than just individuals. This
concept has been described as follows:
In scientific public health, we no longer treat the individual-the segment of the
community-but the total body politic-mental, physical, social, and economic.
We no longer treat individuals with communicable diseases, but we prevent, con-
trol, or eradicate the disease in the body politic. The total patient is our responsibil-
ity [i.e., the community], and not the individuals who are a part of it.
McGavran, What is Public Health? 44 Canadian J. Pub. Health 441, 444 (1953). "Public
Health is the scientific diagnosis and treatment of the body politic or community." Id. at 447
(emphasis in original).
As will be seen, this corporate or community focus has significant legal implication since
the "risk" to which study populations may be exposed in studies involving community mea-
surements, demographic characteristics, etc., is substantially attenuated when compared
with that inherent in medical research. The traditional assumption, however, is that all
research is therapeutic and aimed at treatment of individuals: "Most biomedical investiga-
tors are. . .interested in taking care of patients and making them well." Barber, The Ethics
of Experimentation With Human Subjects, Scientific Am., Feb. 1976, at 25, 30. No more
articulate expression of the erroneous assumption that all research is necessarily therapeutic
could be found. It is to assist in righting this notion and urging a proper understanding of
institutional review for nontherapeutic research that this articie was written.
8. Therapeutic research, nontherapeutic research.
The Commission recognizes problems with employing the terms "therapeutic" and
"nontherapeutic" research, notwithstanding their common usage, because they
may convey a misleading impression. Research refers to a class of activities de-
signed to develop generalizable new knowledge. Such activities are often engaged
in to learn something about practices designed for the therapy of the individual.
Such research is often called "therapeutic" research; however, the research is not
solely for the therapy of the individual. In order to do research, additional interven-
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unduly restrict public health researchers whose projects do not in-
volve the dangers to subjects that institutional review was designed
to mitigate or avoid.'
The current requirements for institutional review'0 are imposed
by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (DHEW) on institutions administering studies involving
biomedical or behavioral research on human subjects under author-
ity of a provision of title II of the National Research Act of 1974. 1
The necessity for some regulation in this area is apparent from
hearings conducted by the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. The concerns reflected in
testimony before the Subcommittee shaped both the statutory re-
quirement for institutional review boards (IRBs) and the content of
subsequent regulatory guidelines. 2
The Subcommittee heard accounts of the unapproved use of
drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for
other uses, other types of nonpharmaceutical medical experiments,
and medical experiments and treatment without informed consent.
In each of these instances, patients or subjects were not fully in-
formed about the nature of the experiments in which they were
involved or, in some instances, were not told that they were involved
in a medical experiment at all. Specific instances presented in sub-
committee testimony included the following: (1) the use of Depo-
tions over and above those necessary for therapy may need to be done, e.g., random-
ization, blood drawing, catheterization; these interventions may not be "thera-
peutic" for the individual. Some of these interventions may themselves present
risk to the individual-risk unrelated to the therapy of the subject.
Nat'l Comm'n for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
Research Involving Prisoners (1976) [hereinafter cited as National Commission].
The special considerations applicable to therapeutic research are further apparent in the
following caveat-part of Nat'l Comm'n for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, IRB Recommendations, Recommendation (3)(D), Comment (D) at
16 (Draft March 3, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Commission Draft]: "The involvement of a
physician or therapist as an investigator may have significant advantages for patients and
make available to them new forms of therapy. However, research interests may compromise
the therapist's sound judgments regarding therapeutic goals."
9. "In recent years . . . widespread societal concern for privacy and confidentiality,
often manifest in confusing or ambiguous regulations, has made many types of epidemiologic
and other medical investigation increasingly difficult to conduct and, in fact, now threatens
to make many such studies virtually impossible." Gordis, Gold, & Seltser, Privacy Protection
in Epidemiologic and Medical Research: A Challenge and a Responsibility, 105 Am. J. of
Epidemiology 163, 163 (1977).
10. The development of institutional review is surveyed in Ratnoff, Who Shall Decide
When Doctors Disagree? A Review of the Legal Development of Informed Consent and the
Implications of Proposed Lay Review of Human Experimentation, 25 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
472 (1975).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2891-3(a) (Supp. V 1975).
12. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.301 (1976); Hearings, supra note 4, at 3638.
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Provera, a drug approved by the FDA for the treatment of endom-
etrial cancer and endometriosis, as a three-month injectable contra-
ceptive given to more than 1500 women under the Tennessee Mater-
nal Health Family Planning Program without FDA approval and
without informing the women involved; 13. (2) use of diethylstilbestrol
(DES) as a post-coital contraceptive at several universities, al-
though DES was not approved for this use;' (3) psychosurgery on
patients in mental hospitals; 5 (4) use of a "supercoil" experimental
intrauterine device developed by a nonphysician and implanted in
several out-of-state women by a physician; 6 (5) the Tuskegee Sy-
philis Study; 7 (6) biomedical research in prisons and research on
the effects of the biomedical research testing program on the rest of
the prison social structure; 8 (7) the sterilization of minor welfare
recipients without their parents' informed consent.'9 The Subcom-
mittee also learned that, in some instances, research was not scruti-
nized by the researcher's scientific or professional peers and that
some physician researchers simply conducted biomedical research
as an adjunct to their medical practices.
Several bills were introduced in Congress to correct these
abuses.20 One approach was to establish a permanent national com-
mission for the protection of human subjects that would have power
to investigate and report on human subjects research; the commis-
sion would establish guidelines for IRBs and publish and distribute
the decisions made by IRBs. Congress did not fully adopt this ap-
proach in the legislation finally enacted. It was also proposed, but
rejected, that IRBs would be required to have a two-part structure:
(1) a subcommittee that would review the scientific merits of re-
search protocols submitted to it; and (2) a subcommittee that would
"focus primarily on ensuring that the individual subjects of biomed-
ical and behavioral research .. .are as well informed about the
nature of the research as possible and that their rights are protected
to the maximum extent."
2'
What emerged out of this legislative concern over abuses in
experimental biomedical and behavioral research was a law estab-
lishing a temporary National Commission for the Protection of
13. Hearings, supra note 4, at 3638.
14. Id. at 3639.
15. Id. at 3640.
16. Id. at 3642.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 3645.
20. See Ratnoff, supra note 10, at 517 n.280 for list.
21. Hearings, supra note 4, at 3656.
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Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (National
Commission), and a requirement that DHEW mandate institu-
tional review by IRBs and issue guidelines to govern them."2 The
guidelines on "Protection of Human Subjects," published in final
form in the Federal Register in 1975, reflect many of the concerns
already discussed that were before Congress.? For example, an elab-
orate definition of "informed consent" was set out to eliminate the
abuses resulting from widely differing interpretations of that term
as it was used by researchers. 4
1. Institutional Review Board Regulations and the Review Process
a. Scope
The regulations on the protection of human subjects are applic-
able to all DHEW grants and contracts supporting research, devel-
opment, and related activities in which human subjects are in-
volved. This includes nonmedical, educational,2 5 and other research.
Special protection is extended to pregnant women and fetuses under
other parts of the regulations,'2 which are beyond the scope of this
article.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2891-3(a) (Supp. V 1975).
23. 40 Fed. Reg. 11, 854 (1975), 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.301 (1976).
24. The range in practice in securing "informed consent" is reflected in the following
episodes excerpted from the hearings of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
preceding the legislation and regulations on human subjects research:
DepoProvera research (use of FDA-approved drug for an unapproved purpose):
"Anna Burgess, one of the women who received [DepoProvera as an injectable
contraceptive] testified that she was never informed of the potential side effects,
never signed a consent form, and experienced a significant degree of discomfort
after taking the drug. Dr. Kase and Ms. Greenberger reported on the results of a
field investigation in which six women in Cumberland County, Tennessee[,] in-
cluding Miss Burgess, were interviewed about the use of DepoProvera. Dr. Kase
concluded that informed consent was not obtained in any of the six cases, no
attempt was made to achieve patient awareness, and the potential short and long
term hazards of the drug were not discussed."
Hearings, supra note 4, at 3638-39.
The following position of the American Medical Association is analogous:
Dr. Barclay, testifying on behalf of the American Medical Association, said that
the final responsibility for the treatment of patients rests with the individual physi-
cian, and that it was proper for him to have the right to use an unapproved drug
or to perform experimental surgery if that was, in his, the physician's opinion in
the best interest of the patient.
Id. at 3643.
On "informed consent" to medical treatment, as the term is used in its more conven-
tional sense, see Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formation of
Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wis. L. Rev. 124; Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Con-
sent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 628 (1970).
25. See DuVal, supra note 5.
26. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.102(c), .201-211 (1976). IRBs' additional responsibilities are found
in 45 C.F.R. § 46.205 (1976).
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b. Policy
The regulations are designed to safeguard the rights and welfare
of subjects "at risk" in activities supported by DHEW contracts and
grants.
c. Procedure
IRBs are to review research proposals and determine whether
subjects will be placed "at risk." If they will be, the IRB is then
further to determine (1) whether "[tihe risks to the subject are so
outweighed by the sum of the benefit to the subject and the import-
ance of the knowledge to be gained as to warrant a decision to allow
the subject to accept these risks"; (2) whether "[tihe rights and
welfare of such subjects will be adequately protected"; and (3)
whether "[l]egally effective informed consent will be obtained by
adequate and appropriate methods in accordance with the provi-
sions of the regulations.
12 8
The regulations also provide for the periodic review of projects
involving subjects "at risk. 21 9 There is also a requirement that pro-
jects not initially involving human subjects must be brought under
review by the IRB if such subjects are later involved.3 0
d. Sanctions
The responsibility for enforcing these safeguards to subjects
belongs to the institution that receives the funding or is accountable
to DHEW for it.3 ' Institutions must assure DHEW that review will
be instituted. 32 Unapproved studies are not eligible for DHEW fund-
ing.3 3 Negative determinations by an IRB are the primary sanction
27. "As originally proposed the regulation did not contain the words 'legally effective.'
• . . The insertion of the phrase was suggested in comments on the proposed rule. . . . No
explanation of the significance of the addition was given." Duval, supra note 5, at 509 n.121.
28. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (1976).
29. Id. § 46.102(d).
30. Id. § 46.114.
31. Id. § 46.102(a).
32. Id. § 46.104.
33. Failure to conform to the agreement between an institution and DHEW, as set out
in the institution's assurance to DHEW, could lead to a loss of research funding by DHEW.
With respect to sanctions, the Commission Draft, supra note-8, at 9, has proposed the follow-
ing:
Recommendation (2)(A) Federal law should be enacted or amended to author-
ize the secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to carry out the following
duties:
(ii) Compliance activities, including site visits and audits of institutional
19781
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against an investigator, and a negative IRB determination can only
be reversed by the IRB. IRB approval does not obligate an institu-
tion to a particular research project if institutional administrators
disapprove, but the findings of the IRB cannot be rescinded admin-
istratively if they are negative .
3
Since DHEW research is funded by the government and pre-
sumably serves a public interest, it could be argued that the govern-
ment should assume responsibility for the programs it funds and
scrutinize programs for the protection of human subjects. The bur-
eaucratization this approach would entail has precluded adoption
or even serious consideration of it. 3
The government could also protect human subjects by focusing
on bad results and providing compensation for them." This could
be done through an insurance pool built up by the profits of new
research, thereby letting the technical benefits of research bear the
burdens of their discovery, or a no-fault system like workers' com-
pensation for human subjects injured through research. As a less
comprehensive remedy, the Federal Tort Claims Act 3 could be ex-
tended to cover subjects injured through neglience or wrongful con-
review board records, to examine the performance of the boards and their fulfill-
ment of institutional assurances and regulatory requirements ....
Comment: . . .
Site visits, audits of IRB records, and other compliance activities should be
conducted routinely to assure continuing quality control of the performance of
IRBs. The compliance effort should be aimed at educating, improving performance
of IRBs and providing needed advice. Where necessary, however, failure by investi-
gators, institutions or IRBs to meet their responsibilities should be subject to sanc-
tions ranging from warnings to loss of IRB accreditation and consequent ineligibil-
ity to receive federal funds for research involving human subjects or refusal by a
regulatory agency to accept data.
34. 45 C.F.R. § 46.118 (1976).
35. For instance, even the essentially aggrandizing recommendations of the National
Commission eschew national review in favor of local IRB screening as follows:
The Commission believes that the rights of the subjects should be protected
by local review committees operating pursuant to federal regulation and located in
institutions or other entities where research involving human subjects is conducted.
Compared to the possible alternatives of a regional or national review process, local
committees have the advantage of greater familiarity with the actual conditions
surrounding the conduct of research . . . [and] can work in cooperation with local
investigators to assure that [subjects are protected] and . . . that [policies are
fairly applied to investigators] . . ..
Commission Draft, supra note 8, at 1-2.
36. For discussion of an analogous program designed to absorb catastrophic costs of
medical care, see Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovbjerg, Strategies in Underwriting the Costs
of Catastrophic Disease, 40 L. & Contemp. Prob. 122, 127-34 (1976).
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1970). See
W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 131, at 972 (4th ed. 1971).
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duct in government-funded research programs, including projects
conducted by others under a contract or grant. Compensation mech-
anisms would have the advantage of assuming the cost of misadven-
tures in such research as a public cost of advancing knowledge while
at the same time fostering research.
e. Membership and Organization
The membership and organization of the IRBs are controlled by
federal regulation.38 A minimum of five persons is required, and a
quorum for the IRB is a majority of its members. The regulations
require that not all members of the board come from within the
institution itself" or from any single professional group. 0 A board
member is prohibited from participating in a review of his own
project or one in which he is involved, except to the extent of provid-
ing information to the board." Documentation of the training and
experience of board members is required."
An underlying assumption of the regulations is that IRB mem-
bers must be competent to determine when a human subject is
placed "at risk" and, when "subjects at risk" are identified, to be
able to weigh intelligently the risk to the subject against the benefits
to him and to society through the knowledge to be gained by the
research. IRB members must also be knowledgeable enough to know
whether the welfare of the subject will be protected and whether
legally effective informed consent will be obtained. One proposal
considered by Congress but rejected, as was noted earlier, was to
provide for a two-part IRB: one subpart of the board to weigh the
scientific merits of the proposed research protocols and the other to
provide for the protection of the human subjects "at risk. 4 3 Al-
though Congress did not include this two-part IRB in the final lan-
guage of the National Research Act of 1974, elements of both func-
tions are to be found in the present system. They are not clearly
delineated, however. Implicit in weighing the risks and benefits of
a given project is determining whether the research is worth doing
from a scientific point of view and also whether a particular project
is a good way in which to gain the information sought.
4
38. 45 C.F.R. § 46.106(b) (1976). See also Hershey & Miller, supra note 3, at 79-85.
39. 45 C.F.R. § 46.106(b)(4) (1976). Commission Draft, supra note 8, at 14, suggests
that an institution provide remuneration to nonemployees serving on an IRB.
40. 45 C.F.R. § 46.106(b)(5) (1976).
41. Id. § 46.106(b)(3).
42. Id. § 46.106(b)(2).
43. Hearings, supra note 4, at 3656.
44. Proposals to define further the role of the IRB in exercising scientific oversight have
been advanced. E.g., Commission Draft, supra note 8, at 17 states as follows:
19781
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The congressional choice to compel institutions to provide pro-
tection, rather than assuming that responsibility within DHEW,
has forced researchers' peers in an IRB to undertake a fairly com-
plex evaluative task without much legal guidance. Once an IRB
determines that a subject is "at risk" it must consider (1) whether
"[t]he risks to the subject are so outweighed by the sum of the
benefit to the subject and the importance of the knowledge to be
gained as to warrant a decision to allow the subject to accept these
risks"; (2) whether "[tihe rights and welfare of any such subjects
will be adequately protected"; and (3) whether "[lI]egally effective
informed consent will be obtained by adequate and appropriate
methods. . .. "I'
The procedural steps in arriving at the issue of risk are well
illustrated by Crane v. Mathews," wherein the State of Georgia
secured permission from DHEW to impose co-payment require-
ments on its Medicaid recipients47 in an effort to reduce steadily
Recommendation (4) The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare should
require by regulation that all research involving human subjects that is subject to
federal regulation shall be reviewed by an institutional review board and that the
approval of such research shall be based upon affirmative determinations by the
board that:
(a) The research methods are appropriate to the objectives of the research and the
field of study.
The effect of this recommendation would be to compel a double peer review of the scientific
protocols of many projects. See 42 U.S.C. § 2891-4 (Supp. V 1975). Peer review has come
under attack recently as unduly limiting research by channeling it in directions already
sanctioned by scientific consensus. One possible effect of this limitation is to foreclose new
ideas and new technologies by denying them funding and thereby perpetuating the common-
place. See Rosenbaum, Cancer Research: Ordeal By Peers, New Times, Feb. 20, 1978, at 10
(denial of continued funding to Dr. Raymond Damadian of the Biophysical Laboratory,
S.U.N.Y. Brooklyn for continued research on the use of nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR)
for the detection of malignant tissue); Damadian, Minkoff, Golfsmith, Stanford, & Koutcher,
Field Focusing Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (FONAR): Visualization of a Tumor in a Live
Animal, 194 Science 1430 (1976).
45. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(b)(1)-(3) (1976). The adequacy and appropriateness of methods
used to secure informed consent are described in detail at id. §§ 46.103(c)-.110.
46. 417 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1976). See also Clay v. Martin, 509 F.2d 109, 111-13
(2d Cir. 1975) (prisoner's pro se complaint was based on an experimental drug program in
1970 in which plaintiff suffered a serious heart attack after injection with Naltrexone; consent
was based on physician's assurance that the dosage involved would be too small to cause
harm).
47. Under the Medicaid portion of the Social Security Act, states instituting a Medicaid
plan must do so in conformity with the Act and with the approval of the Secretary of DHEW.
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970). Assistance is required for individuals receiving grants under the Act's
cash assistance program, the "categorically needy." Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). The Georgia pro-
gram included only the categorically needy.
The Medicaid program includes both mandatory and optional services. Id. § 1396d(a)(1)-
(17) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Categorically needy recipients cannot be required to contribute
to the costs of mandatory services, and any charges for optional services must be nominal in
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rising Medicaid costs.4" The project was approved as an experiment
on "Recipient Cost Participation in Medicaid Reform" designed to
test whether co-payment "would curtail overutilization in Georgia
of 'marginally needed' health care."49
An action brought by plaintiff Medicaid recipients in federal
district court sought, among other things, a preliminary injunction
against the imposition of co-payment requirements. The prelimi-
nary injunction was denied,50 as was a motion by the Secretary of
DHEW for summary judgment." Following a trial, the court found
that the co-payment project was covered by the regulations for the
protection of human subjects 2 and required submission of the pro-
ject to the state's IRB 3 for review:
The question . .. before the Court is: Are human subjects in-
volved in the Georgia co-payment project in such a way as to
trigger the provisions of 45 C.F.R. § 46? The Court need not deter-
mine whether the subjects are at risk; this is a determination to
be made by the IRB, only after a determination is made that
human subjects are involved.54
Although the cutbacks in benefits were ostensibly justified as
"experiments," they were in fact merely reductions which could be
permitted under applicable Medicaid law only when characterized
as "experimental."5 The Crane court held that IRB review was
accordance with standards approved by the Secretary of DHEW and included as a part of
the state's plan. See Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 536 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
48. It is clear that the Medicaid program has important cost considerations.
The incurring of excess costs with respect to one phase of the Medicaid program
may very well mean a reduction of the program in another area. The public purse,
both that of the state and even of the United States, is not absolutely unlimited.
Accordingly, public officials must make some effort to provide the greatest good
possible at the least possible costs.
Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 540 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
49. The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1970), provided for "experimental, pilot,
or demonstration project[s] which, in the judgment of the Secretary [of DHEW are] likely
to assist in promoting the objectives of [the public assistance program]." Id. § 1315. Such
projects require a waiver by the Secretary. Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 536-37 (N.D.
Ga. 1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1970). The Crane court held that projects approved under a
§ 1315 waiver were subject also to the regulations of the protection of human subjects, 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.301 (1976). Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 545 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
50. Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 540 (N.D. Ga. 1976). The denial was predi-
cated on plaintiff's failure to meet the tests of Canal Auth. of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567
(5th Cir. 1974).
51. Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 540 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
52. Id. at 545; 42 U.S.C. § 1315(b) (1970); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-301 (1976).
53. See Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 543 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (on the Georgia
State IRB).
54. Id. at 544.
55. Id. at 536-37; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315(a), 1396 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974); 45 C.F.R. §§
46.101-.301 (1976).
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required, but it did not address the definitions applicable in that
review.58 The court then denied a motion by the defendant to dis-
miss and granted plaintiff's motion for a permanent injunction to
take effect only if certain conditions, one of which was submission
of the project for IRB approval, were not met. According to plain-
tiff's attorney in Crane, the Georgia IRB "determined [on remand]
that the 'human subjects' [identified by the court in the Crane
case] were 'subjects at risk' and that potential benefits of the expe-
riment were so outweighed by the risks that the project should be
discontinued."57 The experiment was accordingly ended July 30,
1976.58 It should be noted that the result reached by the Georgia
State IRB in Crane may have been compelled in part by the virtual
impossibility of applying the protective safeguards required by the
regulations, such as legally effective informed consent, 59 after sub-
jects were found to be at risk. Since the co-payment requirement
was imposed statewide, 0 securing informed consent would be diffi-
cult or impossible because few welfare recipients would voluntarily
choose to make co-payments. An even more important factor in
Crane was the use of the human subjects research regulations as a
legal strategy to stave off a statewide reduction in Medicaid bene-
fits. While the reduction was styled as an "experiment" by the State
of Georgia and the cooperation of DHEW secured on that basis, the
Medicaid reduction "experiment" was probably not the sort con-
templated by the National Research Act of 1974,1 if the hearings
preceding it are any guide.
56. The Crane court, which did not reach the issue of "risk," was solely concerned with
the lack of definitions for "grants and contracts supporting research, development, and re-
lated activities" in 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1976), which it had to construe in pari materia with
the scope of the § 1315 waiver and with "human subjects" in 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1976).
Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 544 (N.D. Ga. 1976). Since "risk" was not before the
court, its definition was worth only a passing footnote. Id. n.3, which does not clearly establish
the definition of "risk."
57. Quoted in Mullen, supra note 3, at 260.
58. Id.
59. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(b)(3) (1976); see also Mullen, supra note 3, at 260 n.7.
60. A blanket reduction in welfare benefits would entail some but not all of the proce-
dural safeguards of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See Burr v. New Rochelle Mun.
Housing Auth., 479 F.2d 1165, 1169 (2d Cir. 1973), in which the court held "that due process
does not require an adversary hearing before a general rent increase or service charge can be
imposed." See generally Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975).
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 218, 241-2a, 282, 286a, 286b, 287b, 287d, 288a, 289c-1, 289g, 289k, 2891-
I to -3, 295f-2 to -3(b), 295f-3(q), 300a77 (Supp. IV 1974). Cf. Dodson v. Parham, 427 F. Supp.
97 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (proposed restriction of list of drugs for Medicaid recipients for which
reimbursement of pharmacists would be available).
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2. Defining and Determining Risk
The determination of whether a human subject of a research
project is "at risk" is the IRB's principal function, and it is central
to research project approval. It is in this step that an IRB, particu-
larly one in an institution doing public health research, has the
greatest oppoutunity to avoid hampering its institution's research
effort. Public health-related IRBs should weigh carefully how they
understand and apply these guidelines.
The function of any IRB in determining subject risk can most
appropriately be viewed as a two-step process. The initial inquiry
is whether human subjects are involved in the research . 2 If they are
not, then review under these regulations proceeds no further. If they
are, the next step is a determination of whether a subject of the
research will be placed "at risk." This determination is crucial. If
no human subjects are placed "at risk," the further requirements
of the regulations are obviated. 3 "This review shall determine
whether these subjects will be placed at risk, and if risk is in-
volved," 4 then the IRB must consider risk versus benefit, protection
of the subject's rights, and the matter of consent, as previously
mentioned. The form certifying that review has taken place 5 echoes
this procedural view, for IRBs must certify for each project:
Human Subjects: Reviewed, Not at Risk.
Human Subjects: Reviewed, At Risk, Approved.
The words "at risk" have a special definition, supplied by the regu-
lations themselves.
66
a. Defining Risk to Subjects
Under the DHEW regulations, a "subject at risk" is any individual
who may be exposed to the possibility of injury, including physical,
psychological, or social injury, as a consequence of participation as
a subject in any research, development, or related activity which
departs from the application of those established and accepted
methods necessary to meet his needs, or which increases the ordi-
62. "The regulations only apply if a determination is made that the project in question
involves human subjects." Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 543, 547 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
63. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(b) (1976). It is apparently the intent of Commission Draft, supra
note 8, at 2-4, to extend review into the conduct of research involving human subjects who
are not "at risk." Any such expansion of IRB authority should be viewed with caution by
institutions that are seriously interested in innovative research.
64. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(b) (1976).
65. Id. § 46.111(a).
66. Id. § 46.103(b).
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nary risks of daily life, including the recognized risks inherent in a
chosen occupation or field of service.6 7
The definition clearly does not treat all risks as placing a sub-
ject "at risk." The inclusive category of "any individual . . . who
may be exposed to the possibility of injury . . . as a subject in any
research" is carefully limited by the two clauses beginning with
"which" that follow it. Although it is possible to interpret the defini-
tion in a more expansive fashion (more restrictive to researchers), a
construction stressing the language concerning "the possibility of
injury" and viewing any subject as "at risk" who is so exposed
should be rejected for public health research.
This is true because an IRB finding that a subject is "at risk"
in turn mandates the use of DHEW-required procedural protections
such as fully documented, 8 legally effective69 informed consent"
which includes (1) a fair explanation of the procedures to be fol-
lowed and their purposes, including identification of any procedures
which are experimental; (2) a description of any attendant discom-
forts and risks reasonably to be expected; (3) a description of any
benefits reasonably to be expected; (4) a disclosure of any appropri-
ate alternative procedures that might be advantageous for the sub-
ject; (5) an offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures;
and (6) an instruction that the person is free to withdraw his consent
and to discontinue participation in the project or activity at any
time without prejudice to the subject. One option open to IRBs is
to assume that all research on humans places them at risk. If the
additional procedural requirements are imposed on all human re-
search, then at least two positive results follow: (1) Subjects are
extended maximum protection even against remote, highly contin-
gent, or speculative risks. Pushed to an extreme, research might
protect human subjects by reducing even ordinary dangers through
an excess of caution exercised in the experimental environment. (2)
Any possibility of error or liability for error by the IRB in the assess-
ment of "risk," such as errors in applying the definition to the
research protocol,7 is reduced to nil. This safe path also affects
research by limiting it, by making it more costly, and, in some
instances, by adversely affecting research protocols.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 46.110. See also Hershey & Miller, supra note 3, at 29.
69. See DuVal, supra note 5.
70. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(c) (1976). Cf. Berger & Stallones, Legal Liability and Epidemiol-
ogical Research, 106 J. of Epidemiology 177, 178 (1977) ("Determination of informed consent
in epidemiologic studies is particularly difficult").
71. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(b)(3). See also Mullen, supra note 3, at 260 n.7.
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If all subjects are given the maximum procedural protection
available under DHEW guidelines, then these subjects of any re-
search would be extended the same protection as subjects of experi-
mental, therapeutic, medical research. Put another way, a person
asked simply to answer a questionnaire" would be given the same
protection as someone undergoing experimental cancer chemother-
apy.
Under such constraints, some types of public health research
are made more difficult, if not impossible, by procedures that re-
quire fully documented, legally effective informed consent of a type
appropriate by and large only for medical research. An experiment,
for example, may be spoiled if those in either the experimental or
the control group are told that they are involved in an experiment
in which their attitudes or preferences are being observed and evalu-
ated. The fact that the subjects are aware of the experiment, its
purposes, and the alternative paths of behavior may hopelessly prej-
udice the outcome of the experiment.
Another problem is that simple experiments, such as telephone
surveys, may become pointless when subjected to rigid formal re-
quirements of informed consent. Telephone surveys minimize the
cost and effort required by personal contact; but if a rigid applica-
tion of the "at risk" notion requires prior, documented, legally effec-
tive informed consent for a simple telephone interview, then the
researcher might as well rely on the traditional interviewer who can
take a consent form along or he may forego gathering the informa-
tion altogether because of such a restrictive research climate.13
At some point it becomes valid to inquire how important it is
72. Cf. Hershey & Miller, supra note 3, at 29:
Questionnaires raising issues that might be emotionally disturbing or might elicit
potentially embarrassing information also place a subject at risk. Thus, an investi-
gator should be seeking socially neutral information through methods that add no
risk of physical or psychological injury before he requests a determination that
subjects are not at risk.
The extreme or categorical position taken by Hershey & Miller apparently disregards the
potential "risks" in the normal assaults of daily social intercourse. Consider these questions:
"Haven't you had three martinis already?" "Didn't your first pregnancy end in a
miscarriage?" "Have you ever had (an abortion, a vasectomy, venereal disease, tuberculosis,
an ingrown toenail, a disturbing sexual experience, etc.)?" The potential for harm from blunt,
nosey questions is always present but is taken in stride by most as part of the "ordinary risks
of daily life." While the calculated effort on the part of an investigator to ask a blunt or
socially embarrassing question might distinguish it from the chance inquiry at a social gather-
ing, in fact the reply/response (if any) in an experimental context is less exposed to the chance
of disclosure, embarrassment, or coercion than if the question is put at a social occasion.
73. Commission Draft, supra note 3, at 25-26, leaves some latitude for the conduct of
simple surveys without consent formalities, but the force of these in freeing investigators will
largely depend on the definition of "risk" adopted by the IRB.
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to evaluate both innovations and long accepted notions about
health and health care delivery involving human subjects. If any
differentiation for experimental purposes is presumed to entail
"risk," then society faces the unhappy prospect of permitting inno-
vations without being able to evaluate them because disclosure to
the control and acquisition of his consent will destroy the effective-
ness of having a control. If research involving human subjects is
desirable and even necessary, then the IRB can be seen as exercising
a crucial role in the future of research because it can either facilitate
or hamper research by its interpretation of the rules it applies. Some
research, even though it involves humans, does not involve the risks
inherent in novel biological or psychological manipulation or medi-
cal research of a therapeutic nature. In short, elaborate safeguards
should not be required if research does not involve "risk."
b. Determining When Human Subjects Are Placed at Risk
If not every research project involving human subjects places
them at risk, then it is necessary to distinguish between that re-
search which does and that which does not involve risks. The Geor-
gia IRB's finding that human subjects were "at risk" used a broader
interpretation of "subject at risk" than one suggested by the situa-
tions before Congress when it imposed IRB review; Congress legis-
lated in response to projects which departed from established treat-
ment regimens, such as the use of FDA-approved drugs for unap-
proved purposes, psychosurgery, and other techniques of behavior
manipulation.
It should be noted that the areas of concern addressed by the
legislative hearings on the National Research Act of 1974 were the
source of the examples of "risk" cited by DHEW Secretary David
Mathews in a notice published in the Federal Register, "Secretary's
Interpretation of 'Subject at Risk,' ' issued in the midst of the
Crane litigation. The Secretary's interpretation pointed out several
examples of DHEW-funded, welfare-related research in which sub-
jects were not considered by DHEW to be "at risk." It was not
surprising that the instances cited in the Secretary's interpretation
included projects designed to test methods for reducing welfare ben-
efits and their attendant burden on the public fisc in some states.5
The examples cited by the Secretary of how DHEW interprets
the definition of "subject at risk" in the context of the Medicaid
74. 41 Fed. Reg. 26,572-73 (1976).




cutback program are, as will be seen, consistent with a careful read-
ing of the regulations. They also offer public health researchers an
opportunity to avoid problems resulting from unnecessary or inap-
propriate procedural requirements and to achieve greater flexibility
in designing study protocols and appropriate protection for human
subjects of public health research. The Medicaid experiments were
as follows: (1) Some welfare recipients were to report their incomes
more frequently than others for purposes of determining their eligi-
bility for, or the level of, their welfare benefits. (2) Some, but not
all, able-bodied welfare recipients were required to work as a condi-
tion of eligibility. (3) The level of welfare benefits (within prescribed
boundaries) payable to some, but not all, similarly situated welfare
beneficiaries was diminished. (4) Some, but not all, welfare recipi-
ents were required to make a co-payment toward the cost of
governmentally-financed medical care (as in Crane)."
In his interpretation, the Secretary urged that these four experi-
ments
[did] not constitute burdens or effects of the nature that the
regulations [for the protection of human subjects] are intended
to encompass and, therefore, would not place the individuals sub-
ject to these burdens or effects "at risk" within the meaning of the
regulation. In the context of the regulations, there would be no
departure from the range of "established and accepted methods
necessary to meet [the] needs [of the individual]" in these types
of circumstances."
The standard used by the Secretary to measure a "departure"
from the norm was "the average American in his daily life."78 Since
the average able-bodied American must work, it is no departure
from the norm to require able-bodied welfare recipients to work,
even though the norm for welfare recipients is not working. Simi-
larly, income reporting, lowered incomes, and some payment for
medical care79 are not departures from normal experience. The Sec-
76. Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
77. 41 Fed. Reg. 26,573 (1976).
78. Id.
79. Cf. Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 546 (N.D. Ga. 1976):
Certainly the imposition of co-payments, which financially burden recipients de-
fined as the categorically needy in the Georgia Medicaid Program, may inhibit such
individuals from seeking necessary medical services. The Georgia co-payment pro-
ject has the effect of diminishing the amount of money that a family might have
available for basic living needs and forces the family to make a determination
whether to apply that money to basic living needs or to apply it to purchase medical
care. Such an activity . . .[is one] which "deliberately and personally imposes"
upon these human beings.
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retary contended that
the regulations for the protection of human subjects are not in-
tended to protect individuals from the "ordinary risks of daily
life." There are certain risks which may reasonably be encountered
by anyone, for example, the risks inherent in having to make a
decision as to how to allocate funds, or in deciding whether to meet
certain conditions, such as performing work, which are required in
order to obtain funds. The exposure to the risks which emanate
from these choices does not constitute the type of situation against
which the Department's regulations are designed to guard."
The Secretary's interpretation of the definition of "subject at
risk," probably an interpretative rule,"' is entitled to considerable
weight, 2 particularly by members of IRBs, researchers, and those
who may practice before such boards. Board members can in good
faith 3 rely on the interpretation in determining how to apply the
definition.
IRBs are not bound by expansive interpretations of risk by
other boards such as that in Georgia, 4 and that is particularly true
The court's language in dealing with the issue of whether the project implicated "human
subjects" seems to comment almost poignantly, albeit indirectly, on the circumstances of
those subjects as related to the issue of risk reserved by law to the IRB. The degree to which
this influenced the subsequent deliberations cannot be known.
80. 41 Fed. Reg. 26,573 (1976).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1970). See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 5.03
(1958).
82. See 1 K. Davis, supra note 81, § 5.05.
83. On the importance of "good faith" as a necessary predicate for avoiding possible
liability as an IRB member, see note 97 infra.
84. The Georgia State IRB's expansive view of "risk" following Crane illustrates an
important problem with Commission Draft, supra note 8, at 9-10, as follows:
Recommendation (2)(A) Federal law should be enacted or amended to author-
ize the Secretary [of DHEW] to carry out the following duties:
(iii) Educational Activities to assist members of institutional review boards in
recognizing and considering the ethical issues that are presented by research involv-
ing human subjects.
In its comment on this recommendation, the Commission explains that "DHEW should
develop . . . mechanisms for reporting key IRB decisions to promote uniform treatment of
similar protocols. Caution should be exercised, however, to avoid usurping the IRB's decision-
making authority." Id. at 11.
It would be regrettable if the Georgia decision following Crane were to achieve the status
of a "key decision." But compare the following:
In general ethical peer review is hampered by the fact that each committee operates
in isolation and must consider every new issue on its own and without benefit of
precedent. A case-reporting system, such as operates in the law, would make that
unnecessary and would promote both equity among institutions and high stan-
dards.
Barber, The Ethics of Experimentation with Human Subjects, 234 Scientific Am., Feb. 1976,
at 25, 29-30 (1976).
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where those interpretations are in conflict with interpretations pro-
mulgated by the Secretary of DHEW, the agency that is responsible
for the regulations. Boards are free to interpret "risk" more nar-
rowly, so long as they do not evade the minimal protective purpose
of the DHEW regulations already discussed.
Whether boards adopt a narrow or restrictive definition of
"subject at risk," such as the Secretary of DHEW urged in his
interpretation, or a broader definition, such as that applied by the
Georgia State IRB, can have a substantial impact on public health
research. In terms of permissible methodologies of experimental re-
search, the definition of risk can operate constrictively since, under
the regulations, a determination that a subject is placed "at risk"
triggers procedural safeguards which do not apply to other research.
Put another way, under the regulations research in which subjects
are not placed "at risk" is under no greater constraint than is re-
search not involving human subjects at all (except that it must be
passed on initially by the IRB).85 It should be noted, of course, that
professional ethics may impose constraints on research on human
subjects that would not apply to research with mice or dice, but
ethical considerations are not a part of the DHEW regulations and
are not considered further here."
Subject "risk," as has been noted, is defined as "the possibility
of injury, including physical, psychological, or social injury."87 Con-
85. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(b) (1976). See also Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 544-46
(N.D. Ga. 1976); 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a) (1976).
86. Cf. Hershey & Miller, supra note 3, at 29: "Even though there might be no legal
requirement to obtain consent when there are no risks, investigators should seriously consider
obtaining consent out of respect for human dignity" (emphasis added).
On the ethical considerations of human experimentation, see, e.g., Barber, The Ethics
of Experimentation with Human Subjects, Scientific Am., Feb. 1976, at 25; Beecher, Ethics
and Clinical Research, 274 New Eng. J. Med. 1354 (1966), reprinted in Biomedical Ethics,
supra note 3, at 193; Dyck & Richardson, The Moral Justification for Research Using Human
Subjects, Use of Human Subjects in Safety Evaluation of Food Chemicals-Proceedings of a
Conference 229 Nat'l Acad. Sci. & Nat'l Research Council Pub. No. 1491 (1967), reprinted
in Biomedical Ethics, supra note 3, at 243; Fletcher, Human Experimentation: Ethics in the
Consent Situation, 32 L. & Contemp. Prob. 620 (1967); Fletcher, Realities of Patient Consent
to Medical Research, 1 Hastings Center Studies 39 (1973), reprinted in Biomedical Ethics,
supra note 3, at 261; Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human
Subjects, 98 Daedalus 219 (1969), revised in H. Jonas, Philosophical Essays: From Ancient
Creed to Technological Man (1974), reprinted in Biomedical Ethics, supra note 3, at 217;
Shimkin, Scientific Investigations on Man: A Medical Research Worker's Viewpoint, Use of
Human Subjects in Safety Evaluation of Food Chemicals-Proceedings of a Conference 217
Nat'l Acad. Sci. & Nat'l Research Council Pub. No. 1491 (1967), reprinted in Biomedical
Ethics, supra note 3, at 207. "It is to be understood that no [statement of ethical] principles
[that will assist the institution in discharging its responsibilities for protecting the rights and
welfare of subjects] supersede[s] DHEW policy or applicable law." Institutional Guide,
supra note 1, at 5.
87. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b) (1976).
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sistent with the intent of the National Research Act of 1974, the
regulations on institutional review leave considerable discretion"5 to
the IRB members to define when risk exists for the human subjects
of specific research projects. The use of the term "including" in
connection with the catalog of potential areas of harm suggests that
the scope of harm is not limited to those set out in the regulations.
Physical risk is perhaps the easiest example to understand, in
large measure because medical and other researchers and even clini-
cians are familiar with physical consequences, iatrogenic (arising
from therapeutic misadventures) and otherwise, which can and do
occur, as well as their potential liability for intentionally and negli-
gently caused physical harm. Risk of psychological harm is more
difficult because of its emergent nature and nascent legal contours."9
Although the concept of risk is not limited to what is defined in law
to be a physical, psychological, or social risk, such an independent
reference point in law may serve to guide an IRB in its determina-
tions. Risks of harm which are not redressable at law may also be
de minimis for research purposes as well and should be disregarded
by IRBs along with conjectural and hypothetical views of harm.
Social harm includes such things as the risk of embarrassment,
humiliation, stigma, and social or economic reprisal. It implicates,
but probably differs from, the right to privacy.9" Legal harm is an
important adjunct to social risk and probably a distinct category of
subject risk. Legal risks to subjects can arise from research into the
use and effects of narcotics or alcohol when information supplied by
the subject could serve as the basis for his criminal prosecution or
for a civil action against him. Legal harm as a risk is suggested but
not explored in the DHEW Institutional Guide to the regulations on
human subjects' protection.9 Congress has specifically provided for
88. For a discussion of various aspects of IRB discretion, see pp. 449-50 infra and
authorities cited notes 101-105 infra.
89. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (recovery for any resulting
physical injury or objective manifestations of emotional distress). See also Billings v. Atkin-
son, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case
for an Independent Tort, 59 Geo. L.J. 1237 (1971).
90. See W. Prosser, supra note 37, § 117.
91. There are . . . medical and biomedical projects concerned solely with
organs, tissues, body fluids, and other materials obtained in the course of the
routine performance of medical services such as diagnosis, treatment and care, or
at autopsy. The use of these materials obviously involves no element of physical
risk to the subject. However, their use for many research, training, and service
purposes may present psychological, sociological, or legal risks to the subject or his
authorized representatives.
Institutional Guide, supra note 1, at 3. Cf. Hershey & Miller, supra note 3, at 26, 52. See also
Commission Draft, supra note 8, at 25, which states as follows:
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eliminating subject risk with respect to drug and alcohol studies.2
Of course, the failure of an investigator to avail himself of this
provision or the approval of such a project by an IRB without requir-
ing the investigator to secure authorization to protect the subjects'
privacy pursuant to the statute would expose the subject to risk,
thus evidencing negligence on the part of the investigator and possi-
bly a lack of good faith by members of the IRB.
Despite the provision for special protection of information and
subject identities obtained in connection with drug and alcohol
studies, other areas of research have no such safeguards. For in-
stance, substantial probability of legal risk to subjects follows vener-
eal disease research, which could give rise to information useful in
a civil action for tortious infection, 3 or research into the battered
child syndrome, 94 which could result in both civil9" or criminal
liability.
In some studies, subjects would be placed at risk by the creation of documents
linking them with an illegal or stigmatizing characteristic or behavior under study.
The most secure method of protecting confidentiality of subjects in such studies is
to create no written record of their identity, since such records are generally vulner-
able to subpoena. Confidentiality assurances are available from the Department of
Justice and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that may effectively
protect such documents from subpoena in certain studies of illegal behavior or drug
abuse. When such protection is not available in studies in which a breach of confi-
dentiality may be harmful to subjects, and subjects might prefer that there be no
documentation linking them with the research, the IRB may waive the requirement
for documentation of consent in the interest of protecting the subject.
92. The Secretary [of DHEW] may authorize persons engaged in research on
mental health, including research on the use and effect of alcohol and other psy-
choactive drugs, to protect the privacy of individuals who are the subject of such
research by withholding from all persons not connected with the conduct of such
research the names or other identifying characteristics of such individuals. Persons
so authorized to protect the privacy of such individuals may not be compelled in
any Federal, State, or local civil, criminal, administrative, legislative, or other
proceeding to identify such individuals.
42 U.S.C. § 242a(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). The statute was upheld in People v. Still, 80
Misc. 2d 831, 364 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1975) (quashed subpoena duces tecum issued to employees
of the methadone maintenance clinic), modified, 48 App. Div. 2d 366, 369 N.Y.S.2d 759
(1975); People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.2d 379, 298 N.E.2d 651, 345 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1973) (disclo-
sure of pictures of patients taken in connection with a methadone program barred).
93. E.g., Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920), rehearing denied, 181
N.C. 66, 106 S.E. 149 (1921). See W. Prosser, supra note 37, § 18 at 105 & n.73.
94. See The Battered Child (2d ed. R. Heifer & C. Kempe eds. 1974). See also Hogue,
Book Review, 65 Am. J. Pub. Health 414 (1975).
95. See W. Prosser, supra note 37, § 122 at 864-69.
96. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 42-807 (Repl. 1977). An example of a statute providing immunity
to those reporting child abuse in good faith is Ark. Stat. Ann. § 42-814 (Repl. 1977). The
following observations of Berger & Stallones, supra note 70, at 181, appear somewhat wide of
the mark:
A final example of areas where confidentiality of research data conflicts with police
powers concerns studies of causes and possible prevention of child abuse. Substan-
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3. Institutional Review Boards and Administrative Law
Two problems with IRBs are readily apparent, only one of
which can be addressed at the local level without revision of the
DHEW Guidelines. The first problem concerns the excess discretion
vested in IRBs and the need for a clear and coherent definition of
subject "risk." A second and more fundamental problem is the allo-
cation by DHEW of primary responsibility for protecting human
subjects to the IRB rather than to a human subjects' advocate or
ombudsman.
IRBs are creatures both of the federal regulations that require
them of research institutions and of the institutions themselves.
IRBs are bound to apply in good faith97 the federal rules promul-
gated by DHEW. They may also, consistent with state law and
institutional limitations, if any, promulgate their own rules-
procedural and substantive." Without attempting to set forth a
complete model of such rules, it is sufficient to suggest here the
need for a substantive definition of "risk" so that investigators will
know what protocols and activities will result in a higher level of
scrutiny and will trigger protective safeguards. An absence of a defi-
nition can lead to overzealous application of human subjects' pro-
tection by IRBs to the detriment of research to which the protection
has little application.
tially standardized reporting laws in most states guarantee immunity from civil or
criminal liability to anyone who reports suspected child abuse; indeed, legal pres-
sure is oriented toward ensuring that suspected cases are reported to the appropri-
ate state agency (usually the Welfare Department). Such legal provisions are
strengthened by stipulations that fines, imprisonment or both may be levied
against those who knowingly fail to report even suspected cases of child abuse or
neglect. Implementation of this requirement is facilitated by provision for anony-
mous reporting.
(Emphasis added.)
The liability of subjects of research (e.g., abusing parents or guardians), not investiga-
tors, is what the regulations for the protection of human subjects are concerned with. There
is thus a real danger that, for example, research into accidents, accidents involving children
(or their parents), or, more narrowly yet, child abuse, could expose subjects of such research
to prosecution.
97. "Good faith" is necessary to avoid the imposition of liability and is a necessary
predicate to indemnification in Arkansas. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 12-3401 (Repl. 1968 & Cum.
Supp. 1977) provides indemnification for
damages adjudged . . . or . . . a compromise settlement . . . against officers or
employees of the State of Arkansas . . . based on an act or omission by the officer
or employee while acting without malice and in good faith within the course and
scope of his employment and in the performance of his official duties.
See also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, rehearing denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975); Hogue,
Board Member and Administrator Liability Since Wood v. Strickland, 7 (U.N.C.) Sch. L.
Bull. 1 (Oct. 1976).
98. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.106 (1976).
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Hershey and Miller, in their work on the function of the IRB
in a predominantly medical setting, depict the review process as
informal, with the investigator and the IRB members apparently
collaborating in the design of an inoffensive protocol. They state
that "[ilnstitutional review should be an interactional process be-
tween the [IRB] and the investigator, striving to find a way that
the proposed study can be performed in a manner consistent with
public policy and the rights and welfare of the subjects, without
destroying the worth of the study.""9
Ordinarily, interactional processes are unobjectionable, even
salutary, in the academy, but interaction with an IRB guided by
loosely defined and largely subjective concepts of risks to subjects
is likely to lead to a one-sided contest with a detrimental effect to
innovative research. Under federal regulations, investigators are
dependent upon IRB approval for funding and for authority to con-
duct even unfunded studies. Review is pervasive. Investigators must
expect repeated encounters with IRBs if their research routinely
involves human subjects, and it is not likely that they will risk
arguing over details at the expense of an ongoing relationship which
every investigator must hope will be marked by good will.
Proposed recommendations have suggested continuity and sta-
bility in IRBs. These measures would foster competence and famil-
iarity in dealing with problems but will likewise place active investi-
gators further at the mercy of IRBs.'00 Since negative decisions by
an IRB are not appealable,'01 there are substantial opportunities for
abuse of discretion by a board.
99. Hershey & Miller, supra note 3, at 14, 71-74.
100. IRB members should be appointed for a fixed term of at least a year and
should not be removed during this term except for good cause. An IRB's member-
ship should be relatively stable from year to year in order to enhance the experience
of the IRB and to introduce stability into standards applied by the IRB.
Commission Draft, supra note 8, at 14.
101. "Board approvals, favorable actions and recommendations are subject to review
and to disapproval or further restriction by the institutional officials. Board disapprovals,
restrictions, or conditions cannot be rescinded or removed except by action of a Board de-
scribed in the assurance approved by DHEW." 45 C.F.R. § 46.118 (1976).
In its proposed comment to Recommendation (5), the National Commission has ad-
dressed this review problem as follows:
The Commission has not recommended a mechanism for appeal from IRB determi-
nations, since it believes that an IRB should have the final word at its institution
regarding the ethical acceptability of proposed research involving human subjects
. . . .Should an institution wish to establish an appeals process, the Commission
suggests that it be restricted to investigation of prejudice or unfairness and that the
appeals board not be given authority to conduct a secondary review of the protocol
or to reverse the IRB decision.
Commission Draft, supra note 8, at 32.
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Concerning such abuses, Professor Kenneth Davis, who has
written extensively about the problem of delegation,0 2 has proposed
the following reformulation of the nondelegation doctrine to protect
"against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power":
The focus should no longer be exclusively on standards; it should
be on the totality of protections against arbitrariness, including
both safeguards and standards. The key should no longer be statu-
tory words; it should be the protections the administrators in fact
provide, irrespective of what statutes say or fail to say.
0 3
An effective prophylactic against abuse of IRB procedure would
be a proper allocation of functions according to traditional adminis-
trative law models. For example, an IRB should consider limiting
the scope of its inquiry into risk by a definition of "risk" as it is
recognized in the department, school, or institution of which the
IRB is a part. Such a definition should be arrived at after soliciting
information and proposals from affected parties.104 Such a definition
would circumscribe the work of the IRB and prevent the abuse of
its discretion in the interaction between investigators and the
board. 105
As a second step, the review process should be tailored along
the lines of an ajudicatory hearing with minimal due process re-
102. E.g., K. Davis, Discretionary Justice-A Preliminary Inquiry (1969).
103. Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713 (1969). See also
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Baze-
Ion, C.J.):
Judicial review must operate to ensure that the administrative process itself will
confine and control the exercise of discretion. Courts should require administrative
officers to articulate the btandards and principles that govern their discretionary
decisions in as much detail as possible. Rules and regulations should be freely
formulated by administrators, and revised when necessary. Discretionary decisions
should more often be supported with findings of fact and reasoned opinions.
(Citing K. Davis, Discretionary Justice-A Preliminary Inquiry (1969)) (footnotes omitted).
Cf. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 Okla. L. Rev. 239 (1973) ("I know of no solid
evidence to support the belief that requiring articulation, detailed findings or reasoned opin-
ions enhances the integrity or propriety of the administrative decisions. I think the emphasis
on the redemptive quality of procedural reform is about nine parts myth and one part coconut
oil").
104. For discussion of rule-making hearings based on legislative facts, see 1 K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise, § 7.04 (1958); Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in
the Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402-16 (1942); Friendly, "Some Kind of
Hearing" 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975).
105. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366 (1886) ("The power given . . . is not
confided to their discretion in the legal sense of that term, but is granted to their mere will.
It is purely arbitrary and acknowledges neither guidance nor restraint"). For a discussion of
the constitutional dimension of this problem, see Hogue, Eastlake and Arlington Heights:
New Hurdles in Regulating Urban Land Use? 28 Case Wes. Res. L. Rev. 41, 70 n.174 (1977).
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quired.' 1 Since the investigator will have had an opportunity in
most instances to explain his protocol, it is worth emphasizing that
due process would require notice of an adverse decision, its basis,
and an opportunity to respond orally and/or in writing to the reasons
given. Oral argument is particularly desirable in view of the absence
of any appeals process. It is interesting to note that a recommenda-
tion for more protection than is currently required by due process
was incorporated in the proposals of the National Commission. 107
In some instances it may be desirable to achieve greater proce-
dural protection for investigators by bringing the IRBs at state-
owned institutions under the state's administrative procedure act.'
0 8
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act' provides a useful
106. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). Cf. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
107. Commission Draft, supra note 8, at 28 states as follows: "Recommendation (5)...
The Secretary should require, further, that an institutional review board inform investigators
of the basis of decisions to disapprove or require the modification of proposed research and
give investigators an opportunity to respond in person or in writing."
108. E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 5-701 to -715 (Repl. 1976); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150A-1 (Repl.
1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
Independent bodies such as IRBs are apparently not subject to the federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706 (1970). See Washington Research Project, Inc.
v. Department of HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C. 1973), modified, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (initial review groups (IRGs) of outside consultants
required for project approval not subject to APA's freedom of information provisions).
Some states expressly exclude educational institutions and their constituent bodies from
state administrative procedure acts. For example, the North Carolina exclusion is as follows:
Article 4 of this Chapter, governing judicial review of final agency decisions, shall
apply to the University of North Carolina and its constituent or affiliated boards,
agencies, and institutions, but the University of North Carolina and its constituent
or affiliated boards, agencies, and institutions are specifically exempted from the
remaining provisions of this Chapter.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150A-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
See generally Daye, North Carolina's New Administrative Procedure Act: An Interpre-
tive Analysis, 53 N.C.L. Rev. 833, 842 n.44 (1975).
Final negative determinations by an IRB under 45 C.F.R. § 46.118 (1976) at a branch of
the state university would appear to be reviewable in superior court under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
150A-43 to -52 (Repl. 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977). The scope of review is limited, but where
the record of the proceeding is inadequate and at the discretion of the trial judge, review may
be de novo. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 150A-50 to -51 (Repl. 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
109. 13 U.L.A. 347 (Supp. 1978), enacted with variations as follows: Ark. Stat. Ann.
99 5-701 to -715 (Repl. 1976); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-166 to -189 (West Supp. 1978); D.C.
Code 99 1-1501 to -1510 (Supp. 1 1975); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 3A-101 to -124 (Rev. 1975); Haw.
Rev. Stat. 99 91-1 to -18 (Repl. 1976); Idaho Code §§ 67-5201 to -5218 (1973 & Cum. Supp.
1977); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 127, §§ 1001-1021 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1978); Iowa Code Ann.
§§ 17A.1-.23 (West 1978); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 49:951-:967 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Md.
Code Ann. 99 41-244 to -256A (Repl. 1971); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 24.201-.315 (Cum.
Supp. 1978); Mo. Ann. Stat. 99 536.010-.150 (Vernon 1953 & Cum. Supp. 1978); Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 82-4201 to -4225 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 84-901 to -919 (Supp.
1973); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 233B.010-.160 (1975); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 541-A:1 to -A:9
(Repl. 1974); N.Y. State Admin. Proc. Act (McKinney Special Pamphlet 1977); N.C. Gen.
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example amply solicitous of investigators' interests. Any inclusion
of IRBs within a state administrative procedure act would, however,
have to be approved by the Secretary of DHEW 0 as a part of an
institution's general assurances of compliance.
It is important to note that merely because an IRB responds to
the supposed interests of human subjects does not mean either that
such subjects are properly represented or even that their interests
are adequately articulated. Nor does the presence of a nonprofes-
sional on the IRB, a "consumer" or community member, alleviate
Stat. § 150A-1 to -64 (Repl. 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, 88 301-327
(West 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-35-1 to -35-18 (Reen. 1977); S.D.
Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 1-26-1 to -26-40 (Rev. 1974); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-502 to -527 (Repl.
1971 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, §§ 801-820 (1975 Cum. Supp.); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 34.04.010-.940 (1965 & Supp. 1976); W. Va. Code §§ 29A-1-1 to -7-4 (Repl. 1976
& Cum. Supp. 1977); Wis. Stat Ann. §§ 227.01-26 (West 1957); Wyo. Stat. §§ 9-276.19 to -
276.33 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
110. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.106 (1976). The Commission Draft, supra note 8, at 32, recog-
nizes the possibility of IRBs being subject to state as well as federal law. Thus, the Commis-
sion "supports the principle of open meetings. The public generally should have access to IRB
meetings, limited only by local law or a decision by the IRB to close a meeting in order to
discuss personal or proprietary information." The impact of state open meetings or sunshine
laws should probably be noted in the general assurance to DHEW. Laws will, of course, differ
in their applicability to IRBs; some will be required to comply while others will not. But see
Student Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors v. Byrd, 293 N.C. 594, 239 S.E.2d 415 (1977) (North
Carolina's open meetings statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.1 to -318.6 (Repl. 1974 & Cum.
Supp. 1977) held inapplicable to meetings of the faculty of the law school; the law faculty
held not a part of a governmental body acting as body politic). Accord, Fain v. Faculty of
the College of Law, 552 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. 1977); McLarty v. Board of Regents, 231 Ga. 22,
200 S.E.2d 117 (1973) (faculty-student committee to recommend allocation of revenues from
student fees), cited with approval in Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens, 258 Ark. 69, 79, 522
S.W.2d 350, 356 (1975) (Fogleman, J., concurring). Contra, Cathcart v. Andersen, 85 Wash.
2d 102, 530 P.2d 313 (1975) (law faculty).
Open meetings in Arkansas are governed by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 12-2805 (Repl. 1968), which requires public meetings of "all boards, bureaus,
commissions, or organizations" of the state "supported wholly or in part by public funds, or
expending public funds" to be open. Exceptions are limited to sessions "considering employ-
ment, appointment, promotion, demotion, disciplining or resignation of any public officer or
employee." The sanction for noncompliance is to void any public business not within the
exception that is conducted in executive session and not reenacted in a public session. Id. §
12-2805(b). Injunctions are available to excluded parties. Id. § 12-2806. Arkansas' FOIA
incorporates two standards. Its application to units of local government is limited by § 12-
2805 to "governing bodies" and is possibly subject to the narrow construction followed in
other states in the Student Bar Ass'n and Fain cases discussed above. The broad scope of §
12-2805, however, would preclude a narrower application of the statute when units of state
government are involved. Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens, 258 Ark. 69, 522 S.W.2d 350
(1975) (committees of the university's board of trustees). The Commission proposal that
"IRBs should make provision to consider requests by investigators to close meetings or por-
tions of meetings at which their research proposals will be discussed," Commission Draft,
supra note 8, at 32, is not within the authorized exceptions to Arkansas' FOIA. See also Nat'l
Comm'n for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
Disclosure of Research Information under the Freedom of Information Act (1977).
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the problem. The purpose of the community member is to enhance
the collective expertise of the board and alleviate the possibility of
professional bias in the ethical perspective of the board. So the
addition needed in the IRB review process is an independent spokes-
man for the interests of potential human subjects, a human sub-
jects' advocate or ombudsman"' charged with identifying and artic-
ulating the interests of subjects and representing their position be-
fore the board. It is submitted that this proposal would require a
change in the DHEW regulations since present regulations impose
primary responsibility for subject protection on the IRB. Inherent
in this proposal is a partial transfer of that responsibility from the
IRB, which would become more neutral in its stance and better able
to weigh independently the information presented to it by the inves-
tigator and the human subjects' rights advocate. At the same time,
primary responsibility for advocating subjects' interests would rest
with the ombudsman. Institutions could, however, experiment with
this proposal without shifting responsibility, assuming they file a
revised general assurance with DHEW and secure the Secretary's
approval.
Many of the problems explored in this article, such as IRB
abuses in expansively construing the concept of risk, can be traced
directly to the structure of the IRB and its procedure as prescribed
by DHEW regulations. Under present rules, the board is to function
both as an advocate for the human subjects of the experiment and
as an impartial decision-maker passing on a project's acceptability.
111. The term "ombudsman" is not intended in a limited, technical sense. See Verkuil,
The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 Col. L. Rev. 845, 847 & n.10
(rejecting the narrower concept espoused in The Ombudsman: Citizen's Defender, xii (D.
Rowat ed. 1968)). The human subjects' rights advocate is analogous to the public counsellor
incorporated into the administrative procedure of some state and federal agencies. E.g., 45
U.S.C. §§ 715(a),(d)(2) (Supp. 1976) (Rail Service Planning Office within the Interstate
Commerce Commission); Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 25217(b), 25222 (West Cum. Supp. 1975)
(advisor to California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission); 14
C.F.R. §§ 302.9, 384.7 (1975) (consumer advocate participating in deliberations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board). See also Bloch & Stein, The Public Counsel Concept in Practice: The
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 16 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 215 (1974); Comment, The
Office of Public Counsel: Institutionalizing Public Interest Representation in State
Government, 64 Geo. L.J. 895 (1976).
The literature on the ombudsman is extensive. E.g., W. Gellhorn, When Americans
Complain: Governmental Grievance Procedures (1966); Cramton, A Federal Ombudsman,
1972 Duke L.J. 1; Davis, Ombudsman In America: Officers to Criticize Administrative
Action, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1057 (1961); Frank, The Nebraska Public Counsel-The
Ombudsman, 5 Cum.-Sam. L. Rev. 30 (1974); Comment, A State Statute to Create the
Office of Ombudsman, 2 Harv. J. Legis. 213 (1965).
The role of ombudsman or public counsel is allocated by law in some instances to the
state's attorney general. E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 70-901 to -929 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (Consumer
Protection Division within the office of the Attorney General).
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The fusion of these functions naturally leads to a blurring of respon-
sibility that should be kept distinct. The IRB has the power to
approve or disapprove a proposal; it is the expert decision-making
body. The investigator presents his view of the proposal to the
board, including his perspective on potential harm to subjects.
What is lacking is an independent assessment by an individual
charged with presenting the subjects' interests. The present regula-
tions require both the investigator and the IRB to consider subjects'
interests, but obviously an investigator's other responsibilities affect
his ability to discharge that duty. In fact, the IRB requirement arose
out of an obvious inability to entrust investigators with sole respon-
sibility for subjects. It is not surprising that IRBs saddled with a
dual task-protecting subjects and approving (or disapproving) pro-
jects-tend to give considerable attention to interests of the unre-
presented. Lawyers who have witnessed a court's solicitude for a pro
se litigant matched against qualified legal counsel will recognize the
problem.
Conclusion
The requirement of ethical peer review in the form of IRBs to
protect human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research was
a much-needed response to some obvious abuses, particularly in
medical research. The protection provided by IRBs should be for
real and substantial harms defined in advance by a process of rule-
making reflective of scientific consensus in a given department,
school, or institution. This is particularly appropriate for public
health and other types of nontherapeutic research. At the same
time, some consideration should be given to protecting investigators
from an abuse of discretion by IRBs by adopting standards and
incorporating practices based on minimal notions of due process.
